

Microeconomic Theory II IN-702 Course Outline

This is the second semester of a two-semester course in Microeconomics, intended for graduate students in Economics and related fields.

Texts for the Course

The text the course is *Game Theory* by Jean Tirole and Drew Fudenberg, MIT Press, 1990.

Other useful books that you may wish to consult are:

Game Theory for Applied Economists by Robert Gibbons, Princeton University Press, 1992,
Microeconomic Theory by Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston and Jerry Green, Oxford University Press, 1995, *The Economics of Uncertainty and Information* by Jean Jacques Laffont, MIT Press, *The Theory of Incentives* by Jean Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, Princeton University Press, and *The Economics of Contracts* by B. Salanie, MIT Press

Problem Sets and Exams

Problem sets, related to the material covered in the lectures, will be assigned as the course proceeds. Written solutions to problem sets should be submitted to the teaching assistants within a week of assignment. Problem sets will be discussed in sections.

There will be two prelims and a final exam in this course. The final exam will be based on the entire course material. Your grade for the course will depend on your performance in the two prelims and the final exam, the weights being 30% for each prelim and 40% for the final exam.

Topics

- A. Expected Utility Theory
- B. Static Games of Complete Information
- C. Dynamic Games of Complete Information
- D. Static Games of Incomplete Information
- E. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information

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