Procurement auctions are widely used by governments to contract firms for goods, services, and the implementation of public programs. However, awarding exclusive implementation rights to a single firm may distort market outcomes both during the program and in the post-procurement period when firms need to compete for final consumers. This study leverages data from a field experiment in the residential solar photovoltaic (PV) market that exogenously varied the competitive environment to examine such effects. We show that assigning program participation to multiple firms – rather than awarding exclusivity to a single auction winner – reduces market concentration, lowers equilibrium prices, and increases total demand during and beyond the intervention period. To interpret these findings, we estimate a structural model of solar PV demand along with installers’ bidding and pricing decisions. Our results show that price differences are driven by markups rather than costs, highlighting the central role of market power. These findings suggest that upfront competition and downstream market competition are not necessarily substitutes.