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Seminario Académico CEA-MIPP - MIERCOLES 12 DE OCTUBRE, 12:00 HRS - SALA CONSEJO (401) P/4 BP - Alfonso Montes (Postdoc DII)

Bayesian Persuasion With Costly Information Acquisition

Presenta: Alfonso Montes (Postdoc DII)


We consider a Bayesian persuasion model in which the receiver can gather independent information about the state at a uniformly posterior-separable cost. We show that the sender provides information that prevents the receiver from gathering independent information in equilibrium. When the receiver faces a lower cost of information, her `threat’ of gathering independent information increases, thus decreasing the sender’s power to persuade. A lower cost of information can also hurt the receiver because the sender may provide strictly less information in equilibrium. Finally, we propose a solution method that can be used to solve our model in specific applications.

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