Documento de Trabajo

Loyalty inducing programs and competition with homogeneous goods

We analyze a market where two firms producing a homogenous good compete by means of two mechanisms: prices and a loyalty bonus. We assume that firms act simultaneously when posting their loyalty bonus and prices. Consumers who purchase from a firmin the first period must return the bonus in case they switch providers in the

Local social capital and geographical mobility. A theory

In this paper, we attempt to understand the determinants of mobility by introducing the concept of local social capital. Investing in local ties is rational when workers anticipate that they will not move to another region. Reciprocally, once local social capital is accumulated, incentives to move are reduced. Our model illustrates several types of complementarity leading

On the planner’s loss due to lack of information in bayesian mechanism design

In this paper we study a large class of resource allocation problems with an important complication, the utilization cost of a given resource is private information of a profit maximizing agent. After reviewing the characterization of the optimal bayesian mechanism, we study the informational cost introduced by the presence of private information. Our main result

Multi-period hedge ratios for a multi-asset portfolio when accounting for returns comovement

This article presents a model to select the optimal hedge ratios of a portfolio comprised of an arbitrary number of commodities. In particular, returns dependency and heterogeneous investment horizons are accounted for by copulas and wavelets, respectively. We analyze a portfolio of London Metal Exchange metals for the period July 1993-December 2005, and conclude that

Sequential Procurement Auctions and Their Effect on Investment Decisions

In this paper we characterize the optimal procurement mechanism and the investment level for an environment where two projects must be adjudicated sequentially, and the winner of the first project has the opportunity to invest in a distributional upgrade for its costs in the second project. We study 4 cases, based on the commitment level

Competition with asymmetric switching costs

We analyze the effects of asymmetric switching costs on two identical firms that produce an homogeneousgood and compete in prices. Both firms inherit a fraction of themarket which is “locked-in” by the switching costs. When switching costs are low, firms face a tradeoff between charging a high price to their locked in customers, or pricing

A Note on the Comparative Statics of Optimal Procurement Auctions

We find a necessary and sufficient condition such that a distributional upgrade on a seller’s cost implies a lower expected procurement cost for a buyer. We also show that even under the strongest assumption about this upgrade made in the literature so far, the seller can be worse off, even if this upgrade is costless.

School markets: The impact of information approximating school effectiveness

The impact of competition on academic outcomes is likely to depend on whether parents are informed about schools’ effectiveness or valued added (which may or may not be correlated with absolute measures of their quality), and on whether this information influences their school choices. To explore these issues, this paper considers Chile’s SNED program, which

Marginal Cost Pricing in Hydro-Thermal Power Industries: Is a Capacity Charge Always Needed?

This paper explores marginal cost pricing in hydro-thermal power industries. As in standard peak-load pricing for all-thermal electric systems, pricing consists of an energy charge and a capacity charge. However, the marginal cost of hydro generation now includes the value of water, which is determined endogenously. In turn, the capacity charge equals the marginal cost

What to put on the table

This paper investigates under which circumstances negotiating simultaneously over multiple issues or assets helps reduce inefficiencies due to the presence of asymmetric information. We find that a simultaneous negotiation over multiple assets that are substitutes reduces inefficiencies. The effect is stronger if goods are heterogeneous, and in this case the inefficiency can be eliminated altogether.

Estimating Discount Functions with Consumption Choices over the Lifecycle

Intertemporal preferences are difficult to measure. We estimate time preferences using a structural buffer stock consumption model and the Method of Simulated Moments. The model includes stochastic labor income, liquidity constraints, child and adult dependents, liquid and illiquid assets, revolving credit, retirement, and discount functions that allow short-run and long-run discount rates to differ. Data

The Basic Public Finance of Public-Private Partnerships

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a minimum revenue guarantee and a cap on the firm’s revenues. Yet income guarantees