Documento de Trabajo

Loyalty inducing programs and competition with homogeneous goods

We analyze a market where two firms producing a homogenous good compete by means of two mechanisms: prices and a loyalty bonus. We assume that firms act simultaneously when posting their loyalty bonus and prices. Consumers who purchase from a firmin the first period must return the bonus in case they switch providers in the

Local social capital and geographical mobility. A theory

In this paper, we attempt to understand the determinants of mobility by introducing the concept of local social capital. Investing in local ties is rational when workers anticipate that they will not move to another region. Reciprocally, once local social capital is accumulated, incentives to move are reduced. Our model illustrates several types of complementarity leading

On the planner’s loss due to lack of information in bayesian mechanism design

In this paper we study a large class of resource allocation problems with an important complication, the utilization cost of a given resource is private information of a profit maximizing agent. After reviewing the characterization of the optimal bayesian mechanism, we study the informational cost introduced by the presence of private information. Our main result

Competition with asymmetric switching costs

We analyze the effects of asymmetric switching costs on two identical firms that produce an homogeneousgood and compete in prices. Both firms inherit a fraction of themarket which is “locked-in” by the switching costs. When switching costs are low, firms face a tradeoff between charging a high price to their locked in customers, or pricing

A Note on the Comparative Statics of Optimal Procurement Auctions

We find a necessary and sufficient condition such that a distributional upgrade on a seller’s cost implies a lower expected procurement cost for a buyer. We also show that even under the strongest assumption about this upgrade made in the literature so far, the seller can be worse off, even if this upgrade is costless.

School markets: The impact of information approximating school effectiveness

The impact of competition on academic outcomes is likely to depend on whether parents are informed about schools’ effectiveness or valued added (which may or may not be correlated with absolute measures of their quality), and on whether this information influences their school choices. To explore these issues, this paper considers Chile’s SNED program, which

Marginal Cost Pricing in Hydro-Thermal Power Industries: Is a Capacity Charge Always Needed?

This paper explores marginal cost pricing in hydro-thermal power industries. As in standard peak-load pricing for all-thermal electric systems, pricing consists of an energy charge and a capacity charge. However, the marginal cost of hydro generation now includes the value of water, which is determined endogenously. In turn, the capacity charge equals the marginal cost

What to put on the table

This paper investigates under which circumstances negotiating simultaneously over multiple issues or assets helps reduce inefficiencies due to the presence of asymmetric information. We find that a simultaneous negotiation over multiple assets that are substitutes reduces inefficiencies. The effect is stronger if goods are heterogeneous, and in this case the inefficiency can be eliminated altogether.

Estimating Discount Functions with Consumption Choices over the Lifecycle

Intertemporal preferences are difficult to measure. We estimate time preferences using a structural buffer stock consumption model and the Method of Simulated Moments. The model includes stochastic labor income, liquidity constraints, child and adult dependents, liquid and illiquid assets, revolving credit, retirement, and discount functions that allow short-run and long-run discount rates to differ. Data

The Basic Public Finance of Public-Private Partnerships

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a minimum revenue guarantee and a cap on the firm’s revenues. Yet income guarantees

Sustitución entre Telefonía Fija y Móvil en Chile

En este trabajo se estudia el grado de sustitución entre la telefonía fija y móvil en Chile. Los resultados muestran que la posesión de al menos un teléfono móvil en el hogar reduce el gasto promedio mensual en teléfono fijo en aproximadamente $5400 (31%). A pesar de lo anterior, el cambio estimado en el gasto

Note on Optimal Auctions

This paper considers a general optimal auction problem, with many goods and with a buyer’s utility that can depend non-linearly in his type. We point out that incentive compatibility constraints may be binding even if virtual utilities are strictly increasing in the buyer’s type. More importantly, optimal mechanisms may involve randomizations between different allocations.