Documento de Trabajo

Contingent Protection as Better Insurance

We formalize the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. We use a general equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents cannot contract insurance. We show that these measures are superior

Financial Markets and Inflation under Imperfect Information

Nonlinear Aggregate Investment Dynamics: Theory and Evidence.

In this paper we derive a model of aggregate investment that builds from the lumpy microeconomic behavior of firms facing stochastic fixed adjustment costs. Instead of the standard sharp (S,s) bands, firms` adjustment policies take the form of a probability of adjustment (adjustment hazard) that responds smoothly to changes in firms` capacity gap. The model

Exchange Rate Policies and Capital Account Management: Chile in the 1990s

Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics

Americans who are caught evading taxes in one year may be audited for prior years. While the IRS does not disclose its method of selecting tax returns for audit, it is widely believed that a taxpayer´s probability of being audited is an increasing function of current evasion is a decreasing function of prior evasion, since,

Information, Nonexcludability, and Financial Market Structure

We study the determinants of market structure in financial intermediation markets. We establish that the input of intermediation services-information-is always non-excludable (though not necessarily non-rival), and intermediaries cannot establish property rights over it. We show that non-excludability is the main determinant of market structure, and present a theory in which market structure, margins, and employees`

Aggregate Employment Dynamics: Building from Microeconomic Evidence

This paper studies quarterly employment flows of approximately 10,000 large U.S. manufacturing establishments. We use establishments` hours-week to construct measures of the deviation between desired and actual employment and then we use these as the state variables upon which units decide their employment adjustments. The main findings are: (i) Microeconomic adjustments functions are non-linear, with

Protección y estándares

El objetivo de este trabajo es examinar el comportamiento de un país que impone un estándar mínimo de calidad (EMC) a un bien que producido tanto por una firma doméstica como por un competidor extranjero, el que también abastece su propio mercado. El artículo supone que los costos de producción aumentan con el estándar de

La teoría de la protección contingente

En este trabajo se examina el efecto de la protección contingente sobre el comportamiento estratégico de las firmas. Este tipo de protección consiste en la introducción de potenciales castigos -tasas compensatorias, cuotas, valores aduaneros mínimos u otros- a la firma extranjera cuando un organismo monitor en el país importador observa que una variable ha superado

Estándares laborales y proteccion potencial: ¿Amenazas para Chile?

El objetivo de este trabajo es estudiar en qué medida los estándares laborales podrían ser usados para justificar restricciones a las exportaciones chilenas. Nos interesan tanto las restricciones efectivas como aquéllas más sutiles, en las cuales la posibilidad de se impongan sanciones podrían inducir a los productores chilenos a elevar sus estándares y con ello

A New Mechanism to Auction Highway Franchises

Most developing-country governments lack resources to undertake urgent highway construction programs. This has led to the suggestion that private firms should be given franchises to build, finance, operate and transfer (BOT) highways in exchange for toll revenues. We build a conceptual framework in which we analyze the virtues and limitations of different mechanisms that could

Dynamic Growth Games with Externalities

We examine the dynamics growth in a simple economy with two industrial sectors that exert externalities on each other. We find a solution to the dynamic game that ensues between the two sectors and compare it to the efficient cooperative solution. We show that internalize the externality. The direction of the inefficiency depends on the